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Creating an Integrated Payment System: 
The Evolution of Fedwire
Adam M. Gilbert, Dara Hunt, and Kenneth C. Winch
The following paper is adapted from remarks given by Adam M.
Gilbert before the Seminar on Payment Systems in the European
Union. The seminar, sponsored by the European Monetary Insti-
tute, was held in Frankfurt, Germany, on February 27, 1997.
On January 1, 1999, the countries participating in
the European Union are expected to adopt a single cur-
rency and monetary policy. To support the creation of an
integrated money market and the conduct of a unified
monetary policy, the European Monetary Institute (EMI)
and the national central banks in the European Union are
developing a new payment system, the Trans-European
Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer
(TARGET) system. TARGET will interlink the advanced
payment systems that the central banks of the European
Union have agreed to implement in their own countries.
This linkage will enable the banking sector to process
cross-border payments in the new currency, the euro.
As the European Union moves forward with
TARGET, it is an appropriate time to reconsider the U.S.
experience with Fedwire, the large-dollar funds and
securities transfer system linking the twelve district
Banks of the Federal Reserve System. (See the box for a
brief overview of Fedwire.) Just as TARGET is designed
to ease the flow of funds among financial institutions
throughout Europe, Fedwire allows U.S. financial institutions
to send and receive funds anywhere in the country
through accounts at their local Reserve Banks.
This paper traces the evolution of Fedwire from
twelve separate payment operations, linked only by an
interdistrict communications arrangement, to a more uni-
fied and efficient system. Our account highlights both the
difficulties the Federal Reserve encountered as it sought
to standardize and consolidate payment services and the
lessons it drew from its experience. These lessons may
prove useful to the European Union and to other nations
undertaking a similar integration of payment systems. 
ORIGINS OF THE FEDWIRE SYSTEM 
The motives for linking the payment systems of the
twelve Reserve Banks in the early part of this century
were not unlike the current goals of TARGET. Prior to
and immediately following the creation of the Federal
Reserve System in 1913, exchange rates governed payments
across regions in the United States. Like foreign
exchange rates under a gold standard, the regional
exchange rates for the U.S. dollar moved in a narrow
band established by the costs of shipping gold or currency—
costs that included freight charges and the interest lost
during the time it took for payments to be received
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To address the regional differences in the value of the
U.S. dollar and their perceived negative effect on business, the
Federal Reserve took two steps shortly after its establishment.
First, to eliminate the transit costs in payments, the Federal
Reserve created the Gold Settlement Fund. Thereafter,
commercial banks could settle both intradistrict and inter-
district transfers through their local Reserve Bank, which in
turn would settle with other Reserve Banks through the Gold
Settlement Fund. The arrangement permitted interdistrict
balances to settle through book-entry transfers—a method of
effecting settlements whereby debits and credits are posted to
accounts—and made the physical shipment of gold or
currency unnecessary. Second, the Federal Reserve inaugu-
rated leased-wire communications among the Reserve Banks
and transferred funds daily over the wire at no cost to member
banks. This practice eliminated the interest losses that
occurred during the time it took to transfer funds. By 1918,
these two services helped abolish regional exchange rates and
formed the basic structure of the modern Fedwire system
(Garbade and Silber 1979, p. 10).
NEW CHALLENGES: FEDWIRE
IN RECENT DECADES
Over the years, Fedwire grew more sophisticated as advances
in technology were applied, but it remained structured as a
system that linked twelve operationally unique units. The
widely held view that each Reserve Bank could best serve the
specific needs of institutions in its district helped to
perpetuate a decentralized approach. In addition, because
statutory prohibitions on interstate banking kept banks
from crossing Federal Reserve districts, the lack of
consistency in payment services was not regarded as a prob-
lem by many Fedwire participants. 
Despite these considerations, by the 1960s the need
to standardize services had become increasingly apparent to
the Federal Reserve. The existing system for the interdistrict
and intradistrict transfer of funds was inefficient. Although
the payment units at the various Reserve Banks were required
to originate and receive transfer messages using a common for-
mat, each unit maintained its own funds software, data pro-
cessing center, and computer programmers. As a consequence,
enhancements to Fedwire were time-consuming to execute;
before a change could be implemented, the twelve individual
systems and the electronic interlinks among them had to be
tested. In addition, enhancements had to be introduced on a
staggered basis, or a single cutoff date had to be worked out
among all the Reserve Banks. Coordinating these efforts
proved difficult. Along with creating inefficiencies, this mul-
tisystem environment introduced greater operational risk to
the task of revising and upgrading services. 
In response to these problems, a decision was made
in the 1970s to develop standard software for each key
The Federal Reserve Fedwire system is an electronic funds
and securities transfer system. Depository institutions that
maintain a reserve or clearing account with the Federal
Reserve may use the system. 
Fedwire provides real-time gross settlement for
funds transfers. Each transaction is processed as it is initiated
and settles individually. Settlement for most U.S. govern-
ment securities occurs over the Fedwire book-entry securi-
ties system, a real-time delivery-versus-payment gross
settlement system that allows the immediate and simulta-
neous transfer of securities against payments. 
Operationally, Fedwire has three components:
data processing centers that process and record funds and
securities transfers as they occur, software applications
that operate on the computer systems, and a communica-
tion network that electronically links the Federal Reserve
district Banks with depository institutions.
FEDWIRE: THE FEDERAL RESERVE
WIRE TRANSFER SERVICE 
Over the years, Fedwire grew more sophisticated 
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customers. Nevertheless, with twelve organizations working
independently to improve their local service, a system arose
that as a whole did not fully meet the needs of emerging
regional and national banks. Business managers tried to
address these problems by eliminating district modifications,
but their efforts met with limited success. 
Turning from Fedwire’s electronic funds transfers
to its securities transfers, we find even more striking incon-
sistencies in the services provided by different Reserve
Banks. In fact, despite an effort to develop standard soft-
ware, two completely distinct applications came into oper-
ation. The New York and Philadelphia Reserve Banks used
software called BESS, designed as a high-speed application
that could handle large volumes, while the other ten
Federal Reserve districts used software called SHARE.
Because local modifications were made to these two unique
applications, the difficulties experienced for funds transfers
were exacerbated for Fedwire securities services. In addi-
tion, during the 1980s, new types of securities, such as
mortgage-backed obligations, were added to Fedwire at a
rapid pace, creating the need to update and modify the sys-
tem constantly.
The communication network linking the com-
puter systems of the Federal Reserve Banks and depository
institutions also presented problems. The network tech-
nology available in the 1960s was relatively inefficient. As
a result, all Fedwire interdistrict messages had to pass
through a single hub, in Culpeper, Virginia. In addition, if
a district temporarily lost its connection to Culpeper, it
could not communicate with the entire system. 
payment service. By the early 1980s, a standard software
application had been developed for the Fedwire funds
transfer service. The individual Reserve Banks then imple-
mented copies of this application on their local mainframes. The
single common application was more efficient to develop,
maintain, and modify. 
Unfortunately, during the 1980s, the standard
software applications became increasingly less standard. To
meet the perceived desires of local customers, the
Reserve Banks made modification upon modification
to the common applications. In addition to trying to
satisfy customers, the Reserve Banks made changes to
meet internal reporting and system interfacing
requirements. The components altered at the local
level ranged from peripheral aspects of Fedwire, such
as the type of reports generated, to core elements of the
system, such as communication links. The end result
was an erosion of the standard applications and the
introduction of the same problems experienced earlier.
The system became difficult to update, and the risk of
operational problems grew. 
By the late 1980s, the Federal Reserve was
aware of the limitations and potential problems cre-
ated by the locally modified applications. At the same
time the operations at the Reserve Banks were becoming
more individualized, the need for standard services was
becoming more pronounced. This need was particu-
larly apparent from the perspective of Federal Reserve
customers as the boundaries and distinctions between
districts blurred. One reason for this blurring was that
bank holding companies increasingly operated separate
subsidiary banks in multiple Federal Reserve districts.
In addition, as differences in business practices and finan-
cial markets in regions throughout the United States
diminished, the demands of Fedwire customers became
more homogeneous. Customers also became increas-
ingly concerned about inequalities in the service pro-
vided to institutions in different districts. 
It is important to note that the Reserve Banks
never deliberately made Fedwire less customer friendly. In
fact, the Reserve Banks modified their systems with precisely
the opposite intention—to improve the services for
With twelve organizations working
independently to improve their local service,
a system arose that as a whole did not fully
meet the needs of emerging regional and
national banks.4F R B N Y  E CONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997
In the 1980s, the Federal Reserve incorporated
advances in network technology to address these shortcom-
ings. A new network consisting of a common backbone with
unique local networks was implemented. Each of the
twelve Federal Reserve Banks maintained an independent
local network; switch-routing software linked the networks
for interdistrict messages. Although an improvement over
the central hub model, this network configuration had its
own weaknesses. In particular, the existence of twelve unique
local networks greatly complicated the diagnosis and reso-
lution of technical problems. 
CURRENT STRATEGIES 
FOR CONSOLIDATING SYSTEMS
Recognizing the need for further refinements of Fedwire,
the Federal Reserve is now standardizing and consolidating
software, data processing centers, and communications net-
works for both funds and securities throughout the System.
The software applications that were modified by the
Reserve Banks to meet the needs of local customers are
being replaced by a single application for funds transfers
and a single application for book-entry securities transfers.
In addition, the twelve district data processing centers and
their four backup locations have been consolidated into three
sites: one primary processing center for Fedwire and other
critical national electronic payment and accounting systems,
and two backup sites. The individual Reserve Banks will con-
tinue to maintain their own balance sheets, and customer
relations will be handled locally. Although the conversion to a
more centralized system has gone very smoothly to date, the
relationship of Fedwire customers to the Reserve Banks and
consolidated processing sites is still in transition. Over time, it
will become more difficult for Reserve Banks to maintain their
technical expertise as responsibility for automated operations
is ceded to centralized offices. 
In addition to making these changes in software and
data processing, the Federal Reserve recently converted the
network linking computer systems at the Reserve Banks and
depository institutions to a unified communications network
with common standards and equipment. The new network,
known as FEDNET, is linked with the main processing cen-
ter in New Jersey and the two contingency centers and is
used to process both transactions within a single district
and those between districts. Because FEDNET has standard
connection equipment at depository institutions, it simpli-
fies diagnostic testing and provides improved service and
enhanced disaster recovery capabilities. 
BENEFITS OF CONSOLIDATION
Several important benefits should arise from the initiatives
undertaken in recent years:
• The Federal Reserve will be able to provide uniform
payment services throughout the country. Customers
have repeatedly asked for standard services to eliminate
unnecessary inconvenience and expense and to ensure
that institutions are treated equitably regardless of
their location.
• Redundant resources will be eliminated, and costs will be
reduced. At the start of the year, with consolidation almost
complete, the Federal Reserve was able to reduce the fee
for Fedwire funds transfers by 10 percent. Given the
competitive environment facing both the Federal Reserve
and its customers, the ability to reduce costs without
compromising the integrity of the system is of
utmost importance. 
• In the future, it will be possible to modify payment
systems more quickly and with less risk. 
• The designation of multiple backup facilities for
critical payment systems will enhance contingency
processing capabilities, while the move from twelve
sites to one will improve security. 
The software applications that were modified by 
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As noted, standardizing Fedwire should make it
easier to modify the system quickly. In this regard, a num-
ber of changes are currently being implemented or considered.
The message format for Fedwire funds transfers is being
modified to make it similar to both the CHIPS and the
S.W.I.F.T. message formats.1 This change should provide
significant efficiencies for customers by reducing the need
for manual intervention when transactions are processed
and by eliminating the truncation of payment-related
information when payment orders received via CHIPS and
S.W.I.F.T. are forwarded to Fedwire. Another change,
scheduled to occur in December 1997, will expand the
Fedwire funds processing day to eighteen hours. The
extended hours will give customers additional flexibility
and should create an improved environment for reducing
foreign exchange settlement risk. The Federal Reserve is
also studying extending the hours of the book-entry system.
Most important, whatever changes the Federal Reserve
elects to make, they will be easier to implement in a
standardized and consolidated environment. 
Introducing changes such as these should also be
easier because the management of Fedwire services has been
centralized along with the automated operations themselves.
Payment personnel started out with a diffuse management
approach that relied on a series of committees with repre-
sentation from each Reserve Bank. They have now struc-
tured management responsibilities by establishing
systemwide product offices for wholesale payments, retail
payments, cash, and fiscal services. These offices report to a
six-member policy committee made up of presidents and
first vice presidents from the Reserve Banks. The product
offices also consult with Reserve Bank staff and staff of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
as well as other interested parties. 
The Federal Reserve has coordinated its consolidation
of the payment system with changes in Reserve Bank risk man-
agement designed to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving
financial landscape. For example, with the elimination of barri-
ers to interstate banking in June of this year, each interstate
bank will be given a single account at the Federal Reserve.
Thus, even though a bank based in San Francisco might have a
branch in New York City making payments and transferring
securities over Fedwire, those transfers will be posted to the
books of the San Francisco Reserve Bank. This arrangement
allows a single risk manager at the Reserve Bank with the
primary account relationship to monitor the Reserve Bank’s
credit exposure to a particular customer. In connection with this
change, efforts are also under way to improve the Reserve Banks’
risk management by developing standard operating procedures
for lending at the discount window and by setting uniform
standards on the acceptability and valuation of collateral for
securing credit from the Reserve Banks.
LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
Three major lessons have emerged from the Federal
Reserve’s experience with Fedwire. First, an effective payment
system must be able to respond to changes in financial
markets and technology. It must be flexible enough to
adapt in many areas, including software applications,
data processing, networking, account relationships, risk man-
agement, and management structure. Moreover, any
modifications must be handled effectively from the
perspective of both the central bank and its customers. The
central bank’s responsiveness to change is especially important
when the bank operates in conjunction with private-
sector payment and settlement mechanisms. If the central bank
is unable to adapt its services, it may perpetuate risks and
inefficiencies in the market. 
Second, central banks are likely to feel pressure
to meet the evolving demands of customers and internal
constituents. Unless these pressures are managed, central
banks may respond by modifying systems locally. The
resulting differences may compromise the effectiveness and
adaptability of the system as a whole. The local differences
may also influence where a banking organization chooses to
locate or how it elects to structure its operations.
A central bank must consider how customers will 
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Finally, a central bank must consider how customers
will evaluate its payment services and policies relative
to alternative payment mechanisms. Payment services are,
of course, a banking business. If the potential response of
customers is not given adequate consideration, a market
reaction could occur that is inconsistent with the central
bank’s business or policy objectives. If a central bank makes
its systems too expensive or difficult to use, or does not
provide the services market participants demand, cus-
tomers may well go elsewhere. The implications of such a
development must be carefully considered.
This paper has outlined some of the challenges the
Federal Reserve has faced in establishing a payment system
and the ways in which it has responded. To be sure, this
response is still evolving. As the countries participating in the
European Union develop their own integrated payment
system, they will undoubtedly find unique solutions to the
problems they confront. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve’s
experience with Fedwire may serve as a helpful reference in the
European effort.ENDNOTES
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1. CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System) is a
private funds transfer system that settles on a net basis through
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. S.W.I.F.T. (Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) is a private
network for transferring payment messages; the exchange of funds
(settlement) subsequently takes place over a payment system or
through correspondent banking relationships.
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